Implements NIST FIPS 204 (ML-DSA-65) SHA-3 hashing (FIPS 202) Designed to support DORA & NIS2 controls Assurance in progress: independent security audit, ISO/IEC 27001 and SOC 2 Type II (planned).

Post-quantum tamper-evident audit trail
for enterprise databases, built to last decades.

BusyXChain anchors cryptographic fingerprints of your database changes on an independent, Byzantine fault-tolerant ledger and signs them with NIST-standardised ML-DSA (FIPS 204). Your records stay verifiable long after today’s signatures could be forged. Raw data never leaves your infrastructure.

Independent, verifiable evidence for regulated industries.

On-premise first.  ·  No application code changes.  ·  No data migration.

Why It Matters

Why Signatures Made Today Must Outlive the Quantum Transition

⚠️ The Risk: Forged History

Quantum computers able to run Shor’s algorithm at scale would break the RSA and elliptic-curve signatures that protect most enterprise records today. Nobody can say when. But invoices, contracts, medical files and audit logs must stay trustworthy for 10 to 30 years. A signature forged in 2035 on a record from 2026 is still a forged record.


  • Forged history (integrity): a future attacker rewrites or fabricates signed records. This is the risk BusyXChain addresses.
  • Harvest now, decrypt later (confidentiality): traffic and backups stolen today are decrypted later. This is addressed by post-quantum TLS and encrypted storage in your own stack. BusyXChain complements it and does not replace it.
  • Regulatory context: DORA (in force since January 2025) requires an ICT risk management framework that includes cryptographic controls, and NIS2 requires appropriate cryptography measures. The EU has published a coordinated roadmap for the transition to post-quantum cryptography, and NIST’s draft IR 8547 proposes retiring RSA and elliptic-curve signatures by 2030 and disallowing them by 2035. Regulators do not prescribe a product. They expect a documented plan.

🛡️ What BusyXChain Does

A post-quantum, tamper-evident audit trail for enterprise databases: signed fingerprints of every change, witnessed by an independent validator network and verifiable by auditors without trusting your administrators or us.


  • It does: anchor fingerprints of database changes, sign them with ML-DSA-65, and make later modification, deletion or rollback of anchored records detectable.
  • It does not: encrypt your database, replace TLS, single sign-on or key management, prevent a privileged user from changing data, or decide whether a change was authorised.
  • Status: prototype. 4-node test network, PostgreSQL adapter in development.
Multi-Layer Architecture

Three Layers, Each With One Job

An evidence layer captures and signs, a gateway submits, and an independent validator network witnesses. Each layer can be reviewed and tested on its own.

The Evidence Layer and the Gateway run entirely inside your own network. Raw data never leaves your infrastructure. Only signed Merkle roots travel to the shared validator network, over outbound-only connections.

BusyXChain Three-Layer Architecture — Network Boundary View
🔒 Your Network (VPN / VPC) EVIDENCE LAYER · Inside Your Network Change capture · Canonical hashing · Merkle batching · ML-DSA-65 signing Database Adapters Outbox / logical replication PostgreSQL first Merkle Batching Hash → tree → root One signature per batch Key Custody HSM / KMS Planned Verification Receipts & Merkle proofs Audit export 🔐 Signed Merkle root only — raw data never leaves your network GATEWAY · Inside Your Network Durable queue · Outbound-only mutual TLS · No inbound ports Submission Queue Durable, with retries No silent drops Outbound Channel Mutually authenticated TLS Hybrid PQ key exchange: planned Receipt Handler Confirmations from ledger Stored in a side table ZK Prover (optional) Research prototype Selected use cases 📦 Signed Merkle roots only — outbound connection 🌐 Shared Validator Network VALIDATOR NETWORK · Independent Witness PBFT Consensus · ML-DSA-65 · SHA-3 · Anchors signed batch roots V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 Immutable Ledger · Deterministic Finality · Validator Identity Registry
Shared Layer

Validator Network — Independent Witness Prototype

  • ML-DSA-65: NIST FIPS 204 signatures, a lattice-based algorithm designed to resist quantum attacks (NIST security category 3).
  • PBFT consensus: safe while at most f of 3f+1 validators are faulty, with deterministic finality under standard BFT assumptions.
  • SHA-3 hashing for block chaining and Merkle roots.
  • Validators are operated by separate organisations, so no single party can rewrite history.
Inside Your Network

Gateway — Outbound-Only Bridge In development

  • Durable submission queue: signed roots are retried until confirmed. Events are never silently dropped.
  • Outbound-only connection: mutually authenticated TLS to the validator network. No inbound ports are opened on your side.
  • Post-quantum transport: hybrid key exchange is planned.
  • Optional zero-knowledge proofs for selected use cases (research).
Inside Your Network

Evidence Layer — Capture & Sign Prototype

  • Data isolation: raw data never leaves your infrastructure. Only signed Merkle roots do.
  • Database adapters: change capture through the mechanism native to each database. PostgreSQL first.
  • Integrity verification: periodic checks detect later modification, deletion or rollback of anchored records and raise an alert.
  • Salted hashes for personal data (planned).

Performance. Design target: finality within a few seconds. Measured on a 4-validator LAN test network: about 0.6 seconds per consensus round. Figures for larger, geographically distributed networks will be published once measured.

Layer Architecture Comparison

Property Validator Network Gateway Evidence Layer
Primary Goal Independent witness Reliable submission Evidence capture
Cryptography ML-DSA-65, PBFT, SHA-3 Mutual TLS, outbound-only Canonical hashing, Merkle trees, ML-DSA-65
Data Visibility Signed roots only Roots and receipts Full (owner only)
Location Shared validator network Your network Your network
Resilience Against Forged history, Byzantine validators (up to f) Lost or delayed submissions Later tampering (detective control)
On-Premise First

Database Integration Without Application Changes

Your application keeps issuing the same SQL and API calls. A small change-capture component is installed on the database side, using the mechanism native to each system. Your application code is not touched.

ℹ️ On-premise & dedicated VPC. Change capture requires privileged access to the database log, so it is available on on-premise and dedicated VPC deployments.
🔌 HOW THE DATABASE ADAPTER WORKS
YOUR EXISTING APPLICATION (SAP / Oracle ERP / MS Dynamics on-premise / Custom Software)
✗  NO application code changes ✗  NO rewrites ✗  NO data migration
↕  Same API / SQL calls as always
YOUR DATABASE (PostgreSQL first; others planned)
✓  Business tables unchanged ✓  Change capture added (outbox or logical replication) ✓  Receipts in a side table: bxchain_anchor
↕  Durable change capture — nothing is lost if the adapter is offline
EVIDENCE LAYER — inside your network
1. Captures changes durably 2. Canonical record + salted SHA-3-512 hash 3. Builds a Merkle tree per batch 4. Signs the root with ML-DSA-65 5. Submits via the Gateway (outbound) 6. Stores the receipt in a side table
↕  Signed Merkle root only — raw data never leaves your network
GATEWAY  →  VALIDATOR NETWORK
Outbound-only connection  ·  Only the signed root is anchored  ·  PBFT finality (design target: a few seconds)

Illustrative Example — SAP Invoice (BKPF) Planned

Before — your SAP today
-- SAP creates an invoice (unchanged)
INSERT INTO BKPF
  (BUKRS, BELNR, GJAHR, BLART,
   BLDAT, BUDAT, WAERS, WRBTR)
VALUES
  ('1000', '1900000847', '2026',
   'DR', '2026-03-15',
   '2026-03-15', 'EUR', 125000);
After — with BusyXChain adapter
-- 1. Same posting — SAP is unchanged
INSERT INTO BKPF ...
VALUES ('1000', '1900000847', ...);

-- 2. Adapter runs in the background:
--   change captured (supported SAP mechanism)
--   canonical record + salted SHA-3-512
--   added to a Merkle batch
--   root signed with ML-DSA-65 and anchored

-- 3. Receipt stored in a custom table:
INSERT INTO ZBXC_ANCHOR
  (BUKRS, BELNR, GJAHR, BATCH_ID, MERKLE_PROOF)
VALUES ('1000', '1900000847', '2026',
  '...-000847', '...');

-- SAP standard tables are never modified.
✗  No application code changes ✗  No change to SAP standard tables ✓  Every anchored change independently verifiable ✓  Detective control: tampering becomes evident

Integration Flow

DB Change Captured
INSERT, UPDATE or DELETE is captured in the same transaction (outbox) or from the replication log, so nothing is lost if the adapter is offline.
Hash & Merkle Batch
A canonical record is hashed with salted SHA-3-512 and grouped into a Merkle tree. Everything runs inside your network.
Root Signed
The Merkle root is signed once with ML-DSA-65. Signing keys are held in an HSM or KMS (planned).
Gateway Submission
The Gateway queues the signed root and submits it over an outbound-only, mutually authenticated connection. No inbound ports.
Anchored On-Chain
Validators reach PBFT consensus and anchor the root. Design target for finality: a few seconds.
Receipt Stored
A receipt (batch id and Merkle proof) is stored in a side table. An auditor verifies record → proof → signed root → ledger entry.
Step 1 / 6

Supported Systems

🐘 PostgreSQL In development
🐬 MySQL / MariaDB Planned
🔶 Oracle DB Planned
🔷 MS SQL Server Planned
🍃 MongoDB Planned
💎 SAP HANA / ERP Planned
Change capture requires privileged access to the database log (WAL / redo log). Available on on-premise and dedicated VPC deployments only.

Anchored Batch (example)

{
  "namespace": "prod_erp",
  "batch_id": "2026-10-20T09:23:11Z-000847",
  "merkle_root": "23e122e9b207...",
  "record_count": 512,
  "alg": "ML-DSA-65",
  "signer_key_id": "adapter-prod-01",
  "signature": "<ML-DSA-65 sig>",
  "timestamp": "2026-10-20T09:23:11Z"
}

What the Audit Trail Proves

That a record had a given value when it was anchored, and that the history has not been altered since. It does not prove that a change was authorised. We recommend anchoring database audit logs as well (planned). There is a delay of a few seconds between a write and its anchoring.

Personal data. Hashes of personal data are themselves personal data. We use salted hashes, and deleting the salt unlinks the on-chain value from the record to support erasure requests (planned; to be confirmed with your data protection officer).

Research

Zero-Knowledge Proofs (zk-STARKs) Research

For use cases where you need to prove something about private data without disclosing it, for example that no invoice exceeds the approved limit. Hash-based, no trusted setup, built on assumptions believed to resist quantum attacks.

Zero-Knowledge Proof Flow (design)
Batch of private records R1 R2 R3 ... ZK Prover Runs inside your network Proves a property of the batch Research prototype OFF-CHAIN ZK Proof ~100–500 KB design target Validator Network Verifies the proof Anchors the result ON-CHAIN VERIFICATION Verifiable Result Deterministic finality Inputs stay private
None
Trusted Setup Required
Hash-based
Proof System
100–500KB
Proof Size (design target)
Research
Current Status
Timeline

Development Roadmap

Milestones follow evidence. Dates are published once they are backed by completed work.

✓
Foundation — Complete
PBFT consensus prototype and ML-DSA-65 signing integration with unit tests. 4-node test network.
Now
In Progress
PostgreSQL adapter with outbox and Merkle anchoring. Reference architecture and benchmark methodology.
Next
Pilots & Hardening
Pilots with one or two design partners. HSM and KMS integration. Preparation for ISO/IEC 27001 and SOC 2 Type II.
Then
Audit & Mainnet
Independent cryptography and security review. Mainnet launch follows completion of the independent audit; date to be announced.
Market Context

How BusyXChain Differs

Where an independent witness and post-quantum signatures matter, and where a simpler tool is enough.

Dimension BusyXChain Built-in database ledgers Permissioned blockchain frameworks Cloud ledger & KMS services
Trust model Independent validator network as external witness Inside one vendor’s trust domain Consortium; depends on how it is set up Provider-hosted
Post-quantum signatures ML-DSA-65
Prototype
Typically classical today Not out of the box Emerging in key management services
Database integration Adapter at the database layer, no application code changes
PostgreSQL first
Native to that one database Custom chaincode or SDK work Custom integration
Data location Raw data stays on your infrastructure In your database On-premise possible Provider cloud
Best fit Long-term independent evidence for regulated enterprises Tamper-evidence inside a single trust domain Multi-party business workflows Managed convenience
💡 WHY ON-PREMISE AND INDEPENDENT

Built-in database ledgers and cloud services give tamper-evidence inside one provider’s trust domain. BusyXChain adds an independent validator network as external witness and post-quantum signatures, running on infrastructure you control.

DORA keeps regulated financial entities accountable for their ICT risk even when ICT services are outsourced (third-party risk provisions, Articles 28 onwards). Many institutions therefore want evidence they can verify independently of any single provider, on infrastructure they control.

When BusyXChain is not the right tool: if tamper-evidence inside a single trust domain is enough for you, a built-in database ledger is simpler and cheaper.

The Team

Building since 2016 —
through every bear market

Prague-based. 8+ years of blockchain infrastructure. While others chased trends, we built deep tech. That's why we were ready to implement quantum resistance the moment NIST finalized the standard.

Marek Szotkowski
Marek Szotkowski
Co-Founder · Lead Blockchain Dev
  • Applied Mathematics — CTU Prague
  • 8+ yrs blockchain infrastructure & security
  • Ethical hacker at Kybernet (financial institutions)
  • Embedded systems engineer at ASUS
Vladimír Lieger
Vladimír Lieger
Co-Founder · CEO
  • Web 3.0 market since 2017
  • Trend forecasting & real-world use cases
  • Business development & investor relations
  • Led successful Gate.io token listing
Robert Michálek
Robert Michálek
Co-Founder · Technical Lead
  • 10+ yrs: IT, Finance, Project Management
  • Backend development & technical operations
  • Enterprise architecture & integration strategy
  • Managing organization's technical roadmap
Sandeep Reddy
Sandeep Reddy
Blockchain Developer · Advisor
  • Former engineer — Gov. of India (1.2B+ users)
  • Full-stack: JavaScript, Go, Python
  • Hyperledger Sawtooth & Fabric experience
  • BSc Chemical Engineering, IIT Roorkee
POST-QUANTUM SIGNATURES · ON-PREMISE FIRST · DESIGNED TO SUPPORT DORA CONTROLS

Evidence That Outlives
Today’s Cryptography.

Anchor changes from your on-premise databases without touching application code. Post-quantum signatures and an independent validator network give auditors evidence they can verify on their own. Deployed inside your own network.

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